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Security Policy

Supported Versions

Version Supported
1.1.x Yes
1.0.x No. Upgrade to 1.1.0, which fixes the findings in docs/claude/.

Reporting a Vulnerability

Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting (Security → Report a vulnerability). Do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability.

Include the affected version or commit, the component (icx-proxy, hooks, MCP server, workspace store, bus), reproduction steps, and the impact you observed. You should get an acknowledgement within 7 days. Fixes are released as a patch version with a GitHub security advisory crediting the reporter unless you ask otherwise.

Security Invariants (v1.1.0)

  1. Secret redaction before storage. SecretRedactor::redact (crates/icx-codec/src/redact.rs) removes recognized credentials before content is chunked, hashed or published on the bus. It is pattern- and entropy-based, so it reduces but cannot guarantee the absence of secrets.
  2. Lossless, integrity-checked storage. Redacted content is stored byte-exact in a BLAKE3 content-addressed store; reads re-verify the digest and fail closed. A 64-bit handle collision is refused instead of overwriting.
  3. Untrusted content stays data. Text returned to a model (deref, slice, grep, tail slots) is Tier-0 escaped and framed with a trust=untrusted_data provenance header. icx structural markers found anywhere in conversation input are escaped unless they are byte-identical to a block icx itself emitted.
  4. Workspace trust. Workspace stores live under $XDG_STATE_HOME/icx/workspaces/ (0700 directories, 0600 files), are sealed with a keyed BLAKE3 MAC under a per-install key, and are refused if they are not owned by the current user, are group/world-accessible, or fail the seal. A repository-local .icx/ is never loaded implicitly; icx trust --dir adopts one explicitly.
  5. Local-only proxy with authentication. icx proxy binds loopback addresses only unless --allow-remote is given, and requires a per-install token (/t/<token> path prefix or x-icx-token header) unless --insecure-no-auth is given.
  6. Daemon and bus isolation. The resident daemon listens on a Unix socket in a 0700 runtime directory and checks the peer UID with SO_PEERCRED. The file-backed bus refuses symlinks, files owned by another user, and group/world-accessible modes.
  7. No unsafe code. unsafe_code = "forbid" applies to every crate.

See docs/security-and-threat-model.md for the threat model.