Security Policy¶
Supported Versions¶
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
1.1.x |
Yes |
1.0.x |
No. Upgrade to 1.1.0, which fixes the findings in docs/claude/. |
Reporting a Vulnerability¶
Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting (Security → Report a vulnerability). Do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability.
Include the affected version or commit, the component (icx-proxy, hooks, MCP server, workspace
store, bus), reproduction steps, and the impact you observed. You should get an acknowledgement
within 7 days. Fixes are released as a patch version with a GitHub security advisory crediting the
reporter unless you ask otherwise.
Security Invariants (v1.1.0)¶
- Secret redaction before storage.
SecretRedactor::redact(crates/icx-codec/src/redact.rs) removes recognized credentials before content is chunked, hashed or published on the bus. It is pattern- and entropy-based, so it reduces but cannot guarantee the absence of secrets. - Lossless, integrity-checked storage. Redacted content is stored byte-exact in a BLAKE3 content-addressed store; reads re-verify the digest and fail closed. A 64-bit handle collision is refused instead of overwriting.
- Untrusted content stays data. Text returned to a model (deref, slice, grep, tail slots) is
Tier-0 escaped and framed with a
trust=untrusted_dataprovenance header. icx structural markers found anywhere in conversation input are escaped unless they are byte-identical to a block icx itself emitted. - Workspace trust. Workspace stores live under
$XDG_STATE_HOME/icx/workspaces/(0700 directories, 0600 files), are sealed with a keyed BLAKE3 MAC under a per-install key, and are refused if they are not owned by the current user, are group/world-accessible, or fail the seal. A repository-local.icx/is never loaded implicitly;icx trust --diradopts one explicitly. - Local-only proxy with authentication.
icx proxybinds loopback addresses only unless--allow-remoteis given, and requires a per-install token (/t/<token>path prefix orx-icx-tokenheader) unless--insecure-no-authis given. - Daemon and bus isolation. The resident daemon listens on a Unix socket in a 0700 runtime
directory and checks the peer UID with
SO_PEERCRED. The file-backed bus refuses symlinks, files owned by another user, and group/world-accessible modes. - No
unsafecode.unsafe_code = "forbid"applies to every crate.
See docs/security-and-threat-model.md for the threat model.