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05 — Security Findings (Threat-Model Driven)

Workstream W5.

Disclosure note. This repository is public and the findings below affect the released v1.0.0. This document gives the defect, its impact and its fix, and describes reproductions only at a high level. Exploit-level reproduction steps and PoC code are kept outside the repository and can be supplied through a GitHub private security advisory. Do not add them here until the fixes ship.

1. Threat-model claims vs code (docs/security-and-threat-model.md, SECURITY.md)

Claim (location) Status Evidence
Shared memory and a UDS socket live under $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/icx (0700), with SO_PEERCRED uid verification (threat model :19) Absent No UDS, no XDG_RUNTIME_DIR, no SO_PEERCRED anywhere in crates/. The bus defaults to the repo-relative .icx/icx-fabric-v1.shm (main.rs:124-128)
Proxy "must bind strictly to loopback or a 0600 UDS" (:11); "restricted to the local user UID" (SECURITY.md:8) Absent --listen / ICX_PROXY_BIND accept any address, including 0.0.0.0 (main.rs:410-460). No client authentication on any route (ICX-AUD-012)
Every CAS read recomputes BLAKE3 and fails closed (:20) Present cas.rs:279-305
Every edge and packet stamps AgentKind, session_id, t_tx_start, provenance (:21) Partial Timestamps come from a synthetic counter (ICX-AUD-048). Recall and deref output carry no provenance for non-redacted artifacts (wire.rs:350-365)
Mandatory 4-tier redaction before CAS, HDC and bus (:22, SECURITY.md:5) Present but leaky Placement is correct (mmu.rs:246-278); recall gaps in ICX-AUD-015 and ICX-AUD-016
"Bounded streaming ingestion cap … 64 MiB" (:23) Partial The cap applies only after the whole of stdin is read into memory (main.rs:36,50, ICX-AUD-014)
Tier-0 delimiter escaping means "untrusted data can never forge a top-level AHTL packet" (:24, SECURITY.md:7) Bypassed Escaping is skipped for content that begins with icx's own markers (ICX-AUD-011)
Zero unsafe in all 8 crates (§3) Present cargo geiger: 0 unsafe in first-party crates. Dependencies (blake3 SIMD, serde_json, proc-macro2, syn) contain unsafe, as expected

2. Findings

ICX-AUD-010 — A repository-shipped .icx/ workspace is trusted and injected into agent context (High)

  • Defect:
  • Every hook resolves its workspace to the relative path .icx in the agent's current directory (resolve_workspace_dir, main.rs:130-143).
  • If that directory exists, it is loaded (execute_hook, main.rs:274-296) with no check of ownership, permissions, or whether it is tracked by git.
  • On SessionStart and UserPromptSubmit, recalled entries from that store are inserted into the model's additionalContext. That includes their subject labels, which are attacker-chosen text (about 56 characters each).
  • Their handles dereference to full attacker-authored bodies, through the MCP pager and icx deref, with no untrusted-content marker.
  • Reproduction (summary): a repository that contains a crafted .icx/ directory, once cloned and opened in an agent with icx hooks installed, injects attacker text into the first turn of every session. Verified end-to-end with the release binary at c176d03.
  • Impact: persistent indirect prompt injection with first-turn placement, delivered by git clone. It defeats the Tier-0 guarantee, because the content never passes through ingestion.
  • Remediation:
  • Store workspaces outside the repository by default (for example $XDG_STATE_HOME/icx/<blake3(canonical repo root)>).
  • Refuse a workspace directory that is git-tracked, not owned by geteuid(), or group/world-writable.
  • Validate label length and charset on load, not only at ingest.
  • Wrap every recalled or dereferenced body in an explicit untrusted-data envelope.

ICX-AUD-011 — In-band trust markers: icx recognizes "its own" content by prefixes an attacker can type (Medium-High)

  • Proxy: message strings and text blocks that start with ⟦ or ⟪ICX: skip both virtualization and redaction (wire.rs:225, wire.rs:256). They reach the model unchanged and indistinguishable from genuine icx packets.
  • Hermes adapter:
  • Content starting with ⟪ICX:STUB│, ⟪ICX:HERMES_EPOCH│, ⟪ICX:HERMES_COMPACT│ or ⟪ICX:TAIL_SLOT│ (or a message named icx_tail_slot) is treated as icx-synthesized (hermes.rs:79-89).
  • Embedded ⟦…⟧ lines in such messages keep their structural delimiters; only the segments between separators are sanitized (hermes.rs:92-118).
  • The lines are stored with the unchecked put_bytes (hermes.rs:165).
  • No role or provenance check applies, so a tool result or fetched page can forge Ω invariant packets.
  • Evidence: code-path confirmation at the cited lines. A dynamic Hermes PoC was not run.
  • Remediation:
  • Establish provenance out of band: a per-install secret and a keyed MAC (BLAKE3 keyed mode) over every icx-emitted block, or a side table of emitted artifact IDs.
  • Never trust a content prefix. Always apply Tier-0 escaping to content of non-icx origin.

ICX-AUD-012 — The proxy has no client authentication; /health and /sse-expand serve CAS data (Medium)

  • Defect:
  • The proxy (serve_http_listener_with_config, wire.rs:2139) accepts any client.
  • GET /health discloses store statistics.
  • POST /sse-expand expands ⟪!icx:deref(#icx:…)⟫ directives against the CAS and returns the full stored bodies (wire.rs:1981-2009).
  • Non-loopback binds are accepted without warning.
  • Reproduction (summary): with the proxy running, any client that can reach the port and knows a handle receives the stored content. Verified locally.
  • Exploitability: handles are 64-bit, or 48-bit prefixes, and cannot be guessed. Real exposure needs a leaked handle (transcripts, logs, shared screens), plus either a different local user on a multi-user host or a non-loopback bind. A browser page can POST to the loopback port but cannot read the response (no CORS headers).
  • Remediation:
  • Require a per-install bearer token (a 0600 file) on every route.
  • Refuse non-loopback binds unless --allow-remote is given.
  • Remove /sse-expand from the production listener, or gate it behind the token.

ICX-AUD-013 — icx init does not ignore the workspace; directory mode 0755 (Medium, privacy)

  • Defect: icx init creates .icx/ (mode 0755) with no .gitignore. In a git repository the store shows up as untracked files (cas_store.json, mmu_state.json, the bus file). A routine git add -A therefore commits the user's session tool-output history, which the redactor has only partly scrubbed (ICX-AUD-015).
  • Remediation: write .icx/.gitignore containing *, and create the directory with mode
  • Better still, apply ICX-AUD-010 item 1 and keep the workspace out of the repository entirely.

ICX-AUD-014 — Unbounded hook input; the 64 MiB cap applies after full buffering (Medium, DoS)

  • Defect: hook and proxy-transform call read_to_string on stdin with no limit (main.rs:36,50).
  • Measured: a 300 MiB tool output made a single synchronous PostToolUse hook use 1.12 GB RSS and 4.32 s. The stored artifact was silently truncated to 64 MiB.
  • Other unbounded or quadratic paths, from code reading:
  • MCP stdio line length (main.rs:348);
  • unlimited nested fold begin: branches (mcp.rs:310);
  • an O(n²) chunked-SSE rescan (wire.rs:1340-1356);
  • up to 64 proxy threads × 16 MiB request bodies.
  • Remediation:
  • Read stdin through Read::take(ICX_MAX_INGEST_BYTES + 1) and reject or stream the overflow.
  • Cap MCP line length and fold depth.
  • Make SSE parsing incremental.

ICX-AUD-015 — Secret redactor recall gaps (Medium)

  • Leaks (verified):
Input Result
git clone https://alice:<password>@github.com/… leaked: http, https, ftp and git URL user-info is skipped (redact.rs:408); the URL rule covers only database and broker schemes (redact.rs:480-490)
SENDGRID=SG.<22>.<43> leaked: the entropy gate excludes any token containing . (redact.rs:669-677)
Pretty-printed JSON with the key and the secret on different lines leaked: redaction is line-based
Authorization: Bearer ya29.… redacted (Bearer rule)
glpat-… redacted (entropy gate)
ENCRYPTION_KEY: <32 hex> redacted (entropy gate)
  • Static review:
  • There are no explicit rules for glpat-, xapp-, dop_v1_, shpat_, Slack webhook URLs, Azure keys or Twilio SK…; some are caught by the entropy gate only by chance.
  • Sensitive key names PASS, PWD, DSN, COOKIE, SESSION, CREDENTIALS and the bare KEY are missing.
  • Remediation:
  • Import the gitleaks rule corpus (.gitleaks.toml already exists in CI) as a test fixture, and measure recall per rule.
  • Redact URL user-info for every scheme.
  • Handle multi-line JSON and YAML values with a small structural pass.
  • Regression gate: ≥ 95% recall on the gitleaks rule fixtures.

ICX-AUD-016 — A single-line PEM block makes the redactor delete the rest of the input (Medium, data loss)

  • Defect: a JSON-escaped private key on one line ("-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n…\n-----END…") opens the PEM block. The END marker is checked only on later lines (redact.rs:24-34), so every following line is dropped. In the PoC, a build error on line 3 disappeared. An unterminated BEGIN behaves the same way.
  • Remediation: detect BEGIN and END on the same line; cap the block at a reasonable number of lines (for example 200) and resume afterwards.

ICX-AUD-017 — The security documentation overstates the shipped controls (Medium)

This rolls up the "Absent", "Partial" and "Bypassed" rows of §1. A threat model that documents controls which do not exist misleads users' own risk decisions.

  • Remediation: rewrite docs/security-and-threat-model.md and SECURITY.md against the code. Mark planned controls as planned. Add a reporting contact (ICX-AUD-037).

ICX-AUD-018 — The agy hook blocks forever on a FIFO transcriptPath (Low)

  • Defect: read_transcript_step calls File::open before checking is_file() (antigravity.rs:155-158). Opening a FIFO for reading blocks, so the hook hung until it was killed (timeout 5 gave exit 124). Arbitrary regular files are read but yield nothing unless they contain agy JSONL step records, so this is not a content-disclosure primitive. The payload is written by agy itself.
  • Remediation: symlink_metadata first, open with O_NONBLOCK, and restrict the path to the agy transcript directory.

ICX-AUD-020 — The curl header temp file holds API keys and survives a crash (Low)

  • Defect: for HTTPS upstreams, client headers, x-api-key and Authorization included, are written to a temp file in $TMPDIR (create_new, mode 0600) for curl -H @file (wire.rs:1718-1751). The file is removed by a drop guard, which does not run on SIGKILL or abort.
  • Remediation: pass headers to curl through stdin (-H @-) or a pipe, or link a TLS client (rustls).

ICX-AUD-009 — The PreToolUse "echo" is dead code (Info)

  • Defect: claude.rs:71-80 and codex.rs:79-85 copy permissionDecision and updatedInput from the hook's stdin into its output. Per the Claude Code hook reference, these are output-only fields and never appear in PreToolUse input, so the code never fires. It is not exploitable, because the stdin is written by the agent.
  • Remediation: delete the code, or implement a real policy.

3. Supply chain and static analysis

Check Result
cargo audit (RustSec, 1,533 advisories) 0 vulnerabilities in 30 crates
osv-scanner on Cargo.lock No issues
cargo deny check advisories, bans and sources OK; licenses FAILED because the repository has no deny.toml (no allow-list policy). See ICX-AUD-040
cargo geiger 0 unsafe in the 8 first-party crates
semgrep (p/rust, p/secrets) 20 hits: 18 temp-dir (17 in tests; 1 production, ICX-AUD-020), 1 env::args (expected for a CLI), 1 PEM test fixture
gitleaks (CI) pinned 8.30.1 with SHA-256 verification: good practice